Decision Theory and Rationality by Jose Luis Bermudez
By Jose Luis Bermudez
The idea that of rationality is a typical thread during the human and social sciences - from political technology to philosophy, from economics to sociology, and from administration technology to selection research. yet what counts as rational motion and rational habit? José Luis Bermúdez explores choice idea as a idea of rationality. selection idea is the mathematical conception of selection and for lots of social scientists it makes the concept that of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically valid. but rationality is an idea with numerous dimensions and the idea of rationality has various roles to play. It performs an action-guiding function (prescribing what counts as a rational resolution of a given selection problem). It performs a normative position (giving us the instruments to move judgment not only on how a choice challenge was once solved, but in addition on the way it was once organize within the first place). And it performs a predictive/explanatory position (telling us how rational brokers will behave, or why they did what they did). This debatable yet obtainable booklet indicates that call thought can't play all of those roles at the same time. And but, it argues, no concept of rationality can play one position with no enjoying the opposite . the realization is that there's no desire of taking choice conception as a concept of rationality.
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Additional resources for Decision Theory and Rationality
Standard models of decision-making under risk identify the rational resolutions of decision problems as those that maximize expected utility. These models take us beyond ordinal utilities. Suppose that you are choosing a ball from an urn with 20 white, 30 black, and 50 red balls. You will receive a prize depending on whether you have correctly predicted what color the ball turns out to be. As it happens you value the prize for the white ball over the prize for the black ball over the prize for the red ball.
To put it in the standard terminology, in thinking about decision-making in conditions of certainty we need appeal only to ordinal, rather than cardinal utilities. For decision-making under certainty decision theory tells us that a rational resolution of a decision problem is one that maximizes utility. If we are resolving the decision problem by solving it then we should choose the action whose outcome has the highest utility. For any agent with a transitive and complete preference ordering (over a ﬁnite set of outcomes) there will always be at least one such an action.
We might plausibly take R to be is preferred or indifferent to (generally called the relation of weak preference), so that aRb holds just if the agent either prefers a to b or is indifferent between a and b. We can use relation R to deﬁne two further relations—a relation of strict preference and a relation of indifference. As one would expect, aPb (the agent strictly prefers a to b) holds just if aRb holds and bRa does not hold, while aIb (the agent is indifferent between a and b) holds just if aRb and bRa both hold.