Consciousness Thought

Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical by Kim Atkins

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By Kim Atkins

This e-book is a part of the starting to be box of useful ways to philosophical questions when it comes to id, enterprise and ethics—approaches which paintings throughout continental and analytical traditions and which Atkins justifies via an explication of ways the constructions of human embodiment necessitate a story version of selfhood, realizing, and ethics.

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Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Perspective

This booklet is a part of the growing to be box of sensible ways to philosophical questions in terms of id, corporation and ethics—approaches which paintings throughout continental and analytical traditions and which Atkins justifies via an explication of the way the buildings of human embodiment necessitate a story version of selfhood, knowing, and ethics.

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23 Without the support of a world of outer objects in which the subject exists and which makes her existence an issue for her, identity becomes redundant because the view from inside lacks any anchoring in the continuity over time (or historicity) of the body from which it views. Perception is not just a view from an empty interior because that interior is always somewhere; it implicitly assumes a view circumscribed by the subject’s perceptual apparatus. Furthermore, points of view are not simply transferable, publicly available locations, as Brook and Parfit suggest.

Although the 24 Narrative Identity and Moral Identity imagination is not subordinated as such to the rules of the Categories, it has no function other than to produce conceptual unities in conformity with them. In fact, the imagination operates as the rules for the application of rules (Categories) to sensible intuitions (CPR, A140/B179). As the means of unifying intuitions and Categories, imagination belongs to both the a priori and the empirical realms. This allows it to function as a kind of glue connecting pure concepts to sensible intuitions in the form of the “Schematism of the productive imagination” (CPR, A138/B177).

It is sympathetic because consciousness is receptive and sensitive to the material world of which it is a part. 11 The phenomenon of double-sensation reveals a “reversibility” between consciousness and the world, through the medium of my body. MerleauPonty writes that “he who is seen cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it, unless, by principle . . he is one of the visibles, capable, by a singular reversal, of seeing them—he who is one of them” (VI, 134–5). This reversibility brings to light the peculiar status of embodied consciousness as both interiority and exteriority.

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