Personal Identity by Godfrey Vesey (auth.)
By Godfrey Vesey (auth.)
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Extra resources for Personal Identity
It is only where 'this' is that I do not know. In a more basic sense I have no doubt where I am - I am here, the place I expressly recognise myself to be in in a way which is not possible for where I am not. It would also mean, presumably, that we could not understand the denial-not-absurd sense of 'knowing where I am' unless we first understood this other sense in which I know where I am even when ,I am completely lost. ) Does Lewis say things about 'I' that are at all like these things that might be said about 'here'?
They are the kernel to which the represented parts of the Self are assimilated, accreted, and knit on' (45, vol 1, p. 341). The upshot is that James's adoption theory seems not to differ significantly from J. R. Jones's theory to the effect that the unity of the mind consists in experiences being related to a 'relatively constant mass of bodily feeling'. What difference there is consists in (a) the use by James of the metaphor of 'adoption' or 'appropriation' -the main point of which seems to be a negative one; namely, that 'consciousness of personal identity .
Lewis holds that self-identity is primary. In brief: for the first possible answer to the Unity Question to be acceptable it would have to be the case that people are conscious of their selves; one argument for this is that a person must be acquainted with his self to use the word 'I'; we have found reasons for thinking this argument to be invalid. Now let us consider the second possible answer. (ii) J. R. JONES'S THEORY According to J. R. Jones (48) the unity of the mind consists in experiences being related to another experience which differs from them in being relatively constant.