The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations by Duncan Pritchard
By Duncan Pritchard
This quantity includes 3 specific investigations into the connection among the character and the price of information. each one is written by means of one of many authors in session with the opposite . 'Knowledge and knowing' (by Duncan Pritchard) significantly examines virtue-theoretic responses to the matter of the price of information, and argues that the ultimately necessary cognitive nation isn't wisdom yet knowing. 'Knowledge and popularity' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of information during which the assumption of a recognitional skill performs a well-known function, and argues that this account allows us higher to appreciate wisdom and its worth. 'Knowledge and motion' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of information and justification and is the reason why wisdom is effective, and permits us to make feel of the data we've got of our intentional activities.
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Extra info for The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
Both environmental epistemic luck and Gettier-style ‘intervening’ epistemic luck fall under the more general category of veritic luck. 37 with this issue since there are, after all, two premises—the achievement thesis (P1), and the robust virtue epistemic account of knowledge (P2)—being used to generate the KA thesis (C1). e. (P2)). After all, it is both true that (i) Barney exhibits a cognitive achievement but does not possess the corresponding knowledge, and that (ii) Barney’s cognitive success is because of his cognitive ability and yet he lacks the corresponding knowledge.
For further discussion of Sosa’s proposal, see n. 21. 28 one’s virtue-theoretic account of knowledge in order to make it Gettier-proof. From a theoretical point of view this is very satisfying, since having such a codicil in one’s account of knowledge looks ad hoc. Why should knowledge have this structure such that the virtue-theoretic component captures almost all the cases, but not quite? Robust virtue epistemology thus appears to have a lot going for it. 3. Knowledge and Achievement As Greco (2009) points out, a further advantage of understanding knowledge along robust virtue-theoretic lines is that it seems to capture the idea of knowledge as being a kind of cognitive achievement.
7. Responding to the Swamping Problem II: The Monistic Response Interestingly, there are two very different ways of denying (1). In particular, while any response to the swamping problem which denied (1) would be committed to denying epistemic value T-monism, it does not follow that in denying this thesis one is thereby endorsing epistemic pluralism. The reason for this is that there are different ways of being an epistemic value monist than being a T-monist. g. 2000), who has explicitly argued for what he calls a ‘knowledge-ﬁrst’ epistemology.