The works of John Locke 2 by John Locke
By John Locke
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21. B u t yet i t is hard to conceive l)iffcrcncc that Socrates, the same indivitlual man, bet~vecn identity of should be two persons. T o help us a mall and little in this, we must consider what is person. meant by Socrates, or the same individual man. First, i t must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance ; in short, the same numcrical soul, and nothing else. Ch. 27. zti(y( / ? I ( / Ilioct-sity. Secondly, or the s a n ~ eanimal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.
Nor is it a t all material to say, that this same, and this distinct consciousness,in the cases above-mentioned, is owing t o the same and distinct immaterial substances, bringing i t with them to those bodies ; which, whether true or no, alters not the casc ; since it is evident the personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no. For granting that the thinking substance in man must be necessnrily sup- Ch.
For in them the variation of great parcels of lnatter alters not the identity : an oak growin? st VOL. 11. C ch. 27. changc of thc parts; so that truly they are not either of them tlie same masses of n~attcr,though they be truly one of them the samc oak, ancl the other the same horse. Thc reason whereof is, that in these two cases, a mass of matter, and a living body, idcntity is not applied to the snmc thing. Identity of $4'. W e must therefore consider whcrein vegetables. an oak diffcrs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such n disposition of thcm as constitutes the parts of an oak ; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receivc 2nd distribute nourishment, so as to continuc and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c.